Quantitative assessment of fault tolerant precision timing for electricity substations by Ingram, David et al.
This is the author’s version of a work that was submitted/accepted for pub-
lication in the following source:
Ingram, David M.E., Schaub, Pascal, Campbell, Duncan A., & Taylor,
Richard R. (2013) Quantitative assessment of fault tolerant precision tim-
ing for electricity substations. IEEE Transactions on Instrumentation and
Measurement. (In Press)
This file was downloaded from: http://eprints.qut.edu.au/56835/
c© Copyright IEEE 2013
Personal use of this material is permitted. However, permission to
reprint/republish this material for advertising or promotional purposes or
for creating new collective works for resale or redistribution to servers or
lists, or to reuse any copyrighted component of this work in other works
must be obtained from the IEEE.
Notice: Changes introduced as a result of publishing processes such as
copy-editing and formatting may not be reflected in this document. For a
definitive version of this work, please refer to the published source:
IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON INSTRUMENTATION AND MEASUREMENT 1
Quantitative Assessment of Fault Tolerant Precision
Timing for Electricity Substations
David M. E. Ingram, Senior Member, IEEE, Pascal Schaub,
Duncan A. Campbell, Member, IEEE, and Richard R. Taylor, Member, IEEE
Abstract—Advanced substation applications, such as syn-
chrophasors and IEC 61850-9-2 sampled value process buses,
depend upon highly accurate synchronizing signals for correct
operation. The IEEE 1588 Precision Timing Protocol (PTP) is
the recommended means of providing precise timing for future
substations. This paper presents a quantitative assessment of PTP
reliability using Fault Tree Analysis. Two network topologies are
proposed that use grandmaster clocks with dual network con-
nections and take advantage of the Best Master Clock Algorithm
(BMCA) from IEEE 1588. The cross-connected grandmaster
topology doubles reliability, and the addition of a shared third
grandmaster gives a nine-fold improvement over duplicated
grandmasters. The performance of BMCA mediated handover of
the grandmaster role during contingencies in the timing system
was evaluated experimentally. The 1 µs performance requirement
of sampled values and synchrophasors are met, even during
network or GPS antenna outages. Slave clocks are shown to
synchronize to the backup grandmaster in response to degraded
performance or loss of the main grandmaster. Slave disturbances
are less than 350 ns provided the grandmaster reference clocks
are not offset from one another. A clear understanding of PTP
reliability and the factors that affect availability will encourage
the adoption of PTP for substation time synchronization.
Index Terms—Computer networks, fault tolerant systems,
IEC 61850, IEEE 1588, power system protection, reliability,
substation automation, synchronization, system performance,
time measurement
I. INTRODUCTION
T IME synchronization has historically been used in sub-stations for consistent event time-stamping to aid power
system incident investigations, for trending and analysis of
operational information, and for some long distance protection
schemes [1], [2]. More accurate time-stamping is now required
for a variety of Substation Automation System (SAS) appli-
cations, which include phasor monitoring and sampled value
transport using digital process buses [3]. Network based time
synchronization systems, such as the Precision Time Protocol
(PTP), IEEE Std 1588 [4], are a means of achieving the high
level of performance required by these new applications [5],
[6]. Substations are now in service that use PTP to synchronize
sampled value process buses [7]. A synchronizing accuracy of
1 µs is required by the “9-2 Light Edition” process bus imple-
mentation guideline adopted by most manufacturers [8], and is
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widely accepted as a prudent requirement for synchrophasors
[9]. The PTP Power System Profile, IEEE Std C37.238,
specifies a restricted set of parameters for PTP that suit power
system applications that require 1 µs accuracy [10].
Reliability of protection systems is of utmost important for
the electric power system [11]. This includes communications
and timing equipment that is required for the protection
system to function. The operation of sampled value protection
schemes and wide area protection systems requires accurate
time synchronization. This imposes a higher level of depend-
ability on the timing system than is currently needed for time-
stamping of event logs or historical data. A distributed timing
system is comprised of many components, and the reliability
of each affects the overall availability.
Network redundancy protocols such as Rapid Spanning Tree
Protocol (RSTP) are a means of dealing with network failures
in a looped or meshed network [12], but do not address
network failures at the point a grandmaster clock connects
to the network. Uncertainty in timing systems also affects
performance, and is affected by the loss or degradation of
grandmaster clocks [13]. The influence of network topology
on SAS reliability is significant, and its network design is a
critical component of a modern SAS [14], [15]. Some process
bus implementations avoid centralized time synchronization,
but this results in many point to point Ethernet connections
[16].
This paper presents a quantitative assessment using Fault
Tree Analysis (FTA) for several timing system architectures
that use the C37.238 power profile. Two new architectures
are presented that take advantage of the Best Master Clock
(BMC) algorithm in IEEE 1588. These architectures intercon-
nect grandmaster clocks, each with multiple PTP interfaces,
to provide multiple sources of synchronization in redundant
protection systems. The effectiveness of BMC, as used in these
topologies, is assessed with a PTP test bed against the 1 µs per-
formance benchmark. This allows various failure modes and
mitigation techniques to be tested with commercially available
PTP products. Detailed reliability analysis of synchronizing
systems is intended to inform the design of timing systems,
and to provide confidence in the technology for future process
bus substations and for other advanced SAS applications.
A quantitative assessment of a timing system’s availability
enables the system to be tailored to the application—avoiding
over-design or inadequate performance.
Background information, including application and regu-
latory requirements, is presented in Section II. The effec-
tiveness of grandmaster redundancy is evaluated with FTA
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Fig. 1. Components of a PTP grandmaster.
in Section III. The experimental methods for assessing the
effectiveness of redundancy are presented in Section IV, and
the corresponding results are shown in Section V. The impact
of these results on PTP for process bus applications are
discussed in Section VI, with final conclusions presented in
Section VII.
II. BACKGROUND
The operation of electricity substations in most countries is
regulated by a combination of standards and grid codes. Inter-
national standards define many of the requirements for equip-
ment used in a substation, while grid codes specify the design,
operational, performance and maintenance requirements of
substations. Standards are largely harmonized throughout the
world, however grid codes can vary significantly between
jurisdictions.
A. Requirements for Protection Reliability
Australia’s National Electricity Market (NEM) covers the
mainland states of New South Wales, Queensland, South Aus-
tralia and Victoria, along with the island state of Tasmania. The
operation of the NEM is regulated by the National Electricity
Rules (NER) [17]. Network service providers are required to
provide protection systems with sufficient redundancy so faults
are cleared within the time specified in the NER when any
single protection element is out of service. This includes any
communication facilities that the protection system depends
upon.
The system operator may require the outage of the protected
plant if one of its protection systems is out of service when
there is a threat to system security. Each feeder or transformer
is protected by two (or more) independent protection schemes
to meet the NER requirements for redundancy. The termi-
nology for the protection schemes vary between utilities, but
common terms are “A and B”, “Main 1 and Main 2” and “X
and Y”. The latter terminology is used in the rest of this paper.
A PTP grandmaster is a critical component in a Substa-
tion Automation System that uses PTP synchronized sampled
values, as it synchronizes sampling throughout the substation.
The system design must allow for these clocks to be taken
out of service (forced or planned outages) without affecting
the operation of the protection system. Other substation ap-
plications (with the exception of wide area protection and
GPS based feeder differential protection) generally use time
synchronization to enhance logging or fault finding, but do not
rely upon timing systems for normal operation.
B. PTP Reliability
Several groups have looked at the performance and fault-
tolerance of PTP timing systems. The reliability of the in-
dividual components is important, as this affects the overall
performance of a fault-tolerant system.
A grandmaster that estimates the drift of its internal os-
cillator will be more accurate [18]. A concern for fail-over
redundancy is the time required for grandmaster selection to
take place, as slave clocks will be free-running while there is
no active grandmaster [13]. There is also a concern regarding
the slave servo response when there is a change of active
grandmaster [19], and it has been suggested that the election
of a new grandmaster can take hundreds of seconds [20]. The
servo response of slave clocks was identified as a concern in
[21], however it was questioned whether a time step would
be a PTP slave test case. The results presented in [6] show
that this is indeed a necessary test, as grandmaster corrections
following drift produce such time steps.
A formal clock synchronization model is presented in [22],
along with the “master group” concept. This improves the
robustness of a timing system. The possibility of detecting
slave clock loss through missing DelayReq messages has been
proposed in [22], but this is not applicable to substation timing
for two reasons. The first is that the peer-delay timing method
is mandated by the C37.238 profile, so there are no DelayReq
messages. Secondly, the PeerDelayReq messages used for
peer-delay measurement are optional for slave clocks that
implement the C37.238 profile. A slave clock that can estimate
the error of the grandmaster is presented in [20]. Such a clock
would enable alarms to be raised if the accuracy requirements
of the application (e.g. process bus or synchrophasors) were
not met.
C. Grandmaster Components
A grandmaster generally consists of the following com-
ponents, each shown in Fig. 1: Global navigation satellite
system (GNSS) antenna, antenna cabling, a GNSS receiver
that regulates a local oscillator, digital pulse outputs such as
1-PPS or IRIG-B (for devices that are not yet capable of using
PTP), a PTP network interface with hardware support for time-
stamping, and a power supply. A grandmaster may be able to
use the GNSS to model the characteristics of the local clock,
and use this model to provide improved hold-over performance
by compensating for temperature and aging [23].
Each of these components has an inherent reliability, the
failure of which will render the grandmaster inoperable (with
the exception of the digital pulse interface). Some grandmas-
ters incorporate redundant power supplies, multiple network
connections, or a combination of the two. The grandmaster
may also provide Network Time Protocol (NTP) services for
applications that have less stringent accuracy requirements.
GNSS antennae are usually active devices with low noise
amplifiers or down-converters located at the antenna. An
induced over-voltage from a lightning strike or high voltage
flashover within the substation may damage the electronics and
disable the timing system. Ideally the GNSS antenna will be
located near the receiver, but an unobstructed view of the sky is
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required. For the purposes of reliability modeling the antenna
cable is included in the antenna reliability figure, and the
remaining components (power supply, GNSS receiver, local
clock, and interfaces) are considered as a single device, which
is referred to as the grandmaster.
PTP is a network protocol, and so there are additional failure
modes for a grandmaster, in addition to GNSS specific failure
modes. These include failures of connecting cables (copper or
fiber optic) and failure of Ethernet switches used to distribute
the PTP messages to client devices.
The BMC algorithm specified in section 9.2 of IEEE
Std 1588 selects the active grandmaster using the following
criteria, in order, until a unique selection is made: priority1,
clockClass, clockAccuracy, offsetScaledLogVariance, priority2
and clockIdentity.
The clockClass in a GNSS synchronized grandmaster
Announce message will change from 6 (synchronized) to
7 (within holdover specification), and then to 52 (outside
holdover specification) when GNSS synchronization is lost.
The clockAccuracy field represents synchronizing error in
terms of time, with common values ranging from 2116
(±100 ns) to 2516 (±10 µs). The combination of clockClass and
clockAccuracy is generally sufficient to hand over the grand-
master role from a defective grandmaster to an alternative.
When the timing system is intact and the priorities are
equal (priority1 and priority2) the decision is made using
clockIdentity. This is a 64-bit number (EUI-64) based on the
clock’s Ethernet address. The clock with the “lowest” EUI-64
(byte-wise comparison starting with the most significant byte
of the EUI-64) address is selected as the grandmaster.
III. GRANDMASTER AVAILABILITY
A sampled value process bus protection system is more
complex than traditional protection systems that use analog
inputs. The reliability of process bus networks has been
evaluated by Tournier and Werner using an “availability”
approach [15]. Assessing the Mean Time Between Failure
(MTBF) and Mean Time To Repair (MTTR) for a GPS
based system has been estimated to require observations over
many years, and therefore the availability of GPS is currently
estimated through modeling [24]. Modeling in this paper
is based upon the FTA and “unavailability” calculations of
substation automation presented by Sheer [25]. More detail
on the construction and use of FTA can be found in [26].
A. Component Reliability
Reliability information has been taken from private corre-
spondence with manufacturers of commercially available PTP
equipment and some publically available MTBF data. The
manufacturers have used either MIL-HDBK-217 or Telcordia
SR332 to estimate MTBF [27], [28]. The MTBF of GPS
antennae ranged from 20 to 59 years, while the grandmaster
clocks incorporating GPS receivers had MTBFs ranging from
14 to 17 years. Transparent clocks had MTBFs from 14 to
33 years. Grandmaster reliability figures incorporate reliability
of the GPS receiver, network interfaces and power supply
components.
TABLE I
RELIABILITY ESTIMATES FOR PTP COMPONENTS.
Component MTBF Unavailability
GPS Antenna 39.5 years QA = 46.3× 10−6
Grandmaster 15.3 years QG = 119× 10−6
Transparent Clock 22.3 years QT = 82.0× 10−6
The averaged estimates of reliability and unavailability for
PTP timing components are presented in Table I. The MTTR
is 16 hours to meet established maintenance standards for
critical protection devices in Queensland, and is based on the
replacement, rather than repair, of a failed device. Unavail-
ability, represented by Q, is calculated from the MTBF and
MTTR using Eqn. (1) and represents the fraction of time that
a device will not be functional, and is therefore dimensionless.
Q =
MTTR
MTBF
, MTTRMTBF (1)
B. Topologies
The simplest approach to improve the reliability of a PTP
timing system is to duplicate the timing equipment, and is the
approach often taken with power system protection. A separate
grandmaster is used for each of the X and Y protection
systems, and is shown in Fig. 2(a). This allows for protection
operation to be maintained in the event of a PTP timing system
failure on either the X or the Y system. This is the minimum
level of redundancy that meets the requirements of the NER.
A fault tree for the timing sub-system is shown in Fig. 2(b).
The X or Y timing system fails if the antenna, grandmaster or
transparent clock fails. For a system failure to occur, a failure
needs to occur simultaneously in both the X and Y systems.
The OR gate represents any one input resulting in failure,
while the AND gate represents all inputs need to fail before
failure occurs. Fault tree symbology is given in Table IV-1
of [26]. This is a major difference between Reliability Block
Diagrams (RBD) and fault trees, as an RBD often follows the
physical topology.
Grandmasters clocks with more than one PTP network
interface allow for more complex topologies. Two such ar-
rangements are proposed in Fig. 3. Fig. 3(a) is a topology
where two dual-port grandmasters are connected to both the
X and Y root switches. Electrical isolation of redundant
protection systems is required, and therefore each grandmaster
should have at least one fiber optic Ethernet interface for
connection to the other system. The “cross-over” ports should
have a larger priority1 setting so the local grandmaster is
the preferred grandmaster. Fig. 3(b) takes this a step further
by introducing a third grandmaster (referred to as “Z”) that
provides backup timing to both the X and Y systems. Again,
the connections between the Z grandmaster and the X and Y
systems should be non-electrical, and the Z priority1 setting
should be set so the X and Y grandmasters are the defaults
for their respective systems.
The fault trees for Fig. 3(a-b) are shown in Fig. 3(c-d) with
the letters A–H representing events. Some events occur on both
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Fig. 2. Basic redundant timing through duplication: (a) topology and (b) the
corresponding fault tree.
sides of the top AND gate and are termed Multiple Occurring
Events (MOE). As a consequence straightforward bottom-up
calculations will give erroneous results [29]. The X and Y
protection systems will operate with any one grandmaster in
the failed state. This is an improvement over the previous
topology, where the failure of a grandmaster disabled the
associated protection system.
A bottom-up method using Boolean reduction has been used
to deal with the MOEs. The Boolean expression for the top
event in Fig. 3(c) is given by Eqn. (2). The expression for
Fig. 3(d) is structured similarly in Eqn. (3). The Boolean
identities a ·a = a and a+a b = a have been used to simplify
the expressions. The unbracketed + represents an OR, and the
terms around the + are termed “cut-sets”, as any one cut-set
occurring results in a failure event, X.
X =((A+B) (C +D) + E) · ((A+B) (C +D) + F )
=C (A+B) +D (A+B) + FE
(2)
X =((A+B) (C +D) + E) · ((C +D) (F +G) +H)
=ACF +BCF +ADF +BDF + CEF +DEF+
ACG+BCG+ADG+BDG+ CEG+DEG+
ACH +BCH +ADH +BDH + EH
(3)
C. Fault Tree Analysis
Unavailability estimates for the GPS antenna (QA), the
grandmaster (QG) and the transparent clock (QT ) are taken
from Table I. While the probability of events A and C is QA
and the probability of events B and D is QG in Fig. 3(c),
the events are not the same. Consequently further Boolean
reduction is not possible. Similarly, events A/C/F, B/D/G and
E/H in 3(d) have the same probability of occurring, but are
independent events.
The unavailability of a timing system with no redundancy,
QSingle, is the addition of the component unavailabilities and
is given by Eqn. (4). The duplicate timing system, shown in
Fig. 2, squares the unavailability of the single system as an
AND gate multiplies the probability of failure of the X and Y
systems. This unavailability, QDup, is given by Eqn. (5), and
does not require Boolean reduction.
QSingle = QA +QG +QT (4)
QDup = (QA +QG +QT )
2 (5)
= (QA +QG)
2
+Q2T + 2QAQT
+2QGQT
Eqn. (6) defines the unavailability of the duplicate system
with cross-connected grandmasters, based on the fault tree in
Fig. 3(c) and the Boolean reduction in Eqn. (2).
QCross = QA (QA +QG) +QG (QA +QG)
2 (6)
+QT ·QT
= (QA +QG)
2
+Q2T
Eqn. (7) represents the unavailability of the triple grandmas-
ter fault tree shown in Fig. 3(d). Any two of the grandmasters
can fail and either of the transparent clocks can fail and
the protection system will remain operational. The additional
(QA +QG + 2QTC) term reduces the unavailability with the
triple grandmaster, resulting in the transparent clock term, Q2T ,
dominating as this is the only second order term.
Q3GM =Q
3
A +Q
3
G +Q
2
T + 3Q
2
AQG + 2Q
2
AQT+
3QAQ
2
G + 2Q
2
GQT + 4QAQGQT
=(QA +QG)
2
(QA +QG + 2QT ) +Q
2
T
(7)
The addition of the third grandmaster significantly improves
the reliability of the X or Y systems, which is given by
Eqn. (8). This is a measure of how reliable timing is within
the X or Y system. Q3GM is not simply the product of QX
and QY as there are common events in both (the Z system).
Clock performance verification may be required more often
than similar tests on protection relays and communications
equipment until in-service performance is ascertained. The
triple grandmaster topology enables any one of the three
grandmasters to be taken out of service without disabling
either of the X or Y protection systems.
QX = QY = (QA +QG)
2
+QT (8)
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Fig. 3. Complex redundant timing topologies: (a) cross-connected dual-port grandmasters and (b) a shared third grandmaster with dual network connection.
(c) and (d) are the fault trees for (a) and (b) respectively. The X, Y and Z components are shaded for identification.
TABLE II
UNAVAILABILITY ESTIMATES FOR PTP SYSTEM TOPOLOGIES.
Topology Unavailability MTBF
Single QSingle = 2.474× 10−4 7.38 yr
Duplicated QDup = 6.121× 10−8 29 813 yr
Cross-connected GM QCross = 3.410× 10−8 53 525 yr
Shared third GM Q3GM = 6.725× 10−9 271 419 yr
Table II lists the unavailability and MTBF for the various
grandmaster (GM) topologies, based on the parameters in
Table I and Equations (4)–(8). The lower limit of unavailability
is set by the unavailability of the transparent clocks.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL METHOD
Two categories of tests were conducted. Firstly, the response
of slave clocks to GPS outages at the grandmaster were tested,
as an extension of the work presented in [6], to verify that
the observed results occurred with all available grandmasters.
The second set of tests assessed the performance of the PTP
timing system with grandmaster redundancy under a range of
contingencies. The overall accuracy of time synchronization is
the measure of how well the system is performing. The ±1 µs
requirement of the 9-2LE guideline was used as the benchmark
of acceptable performance during grandmaster contingency
tests. The settings required by the C37.238 Power Profile,
with the exception of additional data required by C37.238 in
the Announce message, were used by all PTP devices. The
AnnounceTimeout was set to 3 s for all grandmasters.
The PTP test bed was composed of three grandmaster
clocks (Meinberg M600/MRS/PTP, RuggedCom RSG-2288
and Tekron TCG 01-E), three slave clocks (two RuggedCom
RSG-2288 clocks and one Tekron TTM 01-E) and four trans-
parent clocks (Cisco CGS-2520, Hirschmann MACH1040,
Hirschmann MICE and RuggedCom RSG-2288). Fig. 4(a)
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Fig. 4. Substation precision timing test bed for process bus applications. (a)
is the hardware and (b) is a schematic representation. Connections were made
to the 1-PPS outputs of the two grandmasters being tested and to the two slave
clocks. The delay between each was measured by the digital oscilloscope.
shows the hardware used in the test bed, and Fig. 4(b) shows
the connection arrangements. PTPA, PTPC and PTPD were
the network identifiers for the three grandmaster clocks used
in the test bed. PTPB and PTPF were the two slave clocks
used, and a single transparent clock was used to interconnect
these ordinary clocks. The use of a transparent clock avoided
any shortcomings that may have arisen through the use of
end-end delay estimates or use of IEEE 1588-2002 (PTPv1).
The following sub-sections describe how this equipment
was used to test the resilience of a PTP timing system.
A. Measurement System and Accuracy Estimate
The test method used to assess synchronizing performance
used the 1-PPS electrical outputs of the grandmaster and slave
clocks, which is an established technique [30]–[32]. A digital
oscilloscope (Tektronix DPO2014) sampling at 109 samples/s
measured the time difference (which is referred to as “delay”
in these results) between the reference (grandmaster) and slave
clocks for the duration of each test. A computer recorded
each measurement for statistical analysis. Each grandmaster
sent a Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP) “trap”
message that time-stamped when the antenna connection state
changed. PTP Ethernet frames were captured from the grand-
masters for analysis of the Announce messages. The test bed
had three grandmasters available, but only two were connected
at any time. This enabled the operation of the BMC algorithm
to be tested under a variety of conditions. This type of
handover was required by the redundant connections shown
in Fig. 3(a) and Fig. 3(b). The 1-PPS outputs of the two
active grandmasters were connected to the oscilloscope for
delay measurement, along with the 1-PPS outputs of the two
slave clocks.
The time base of the oscilloscope was checked using a
GPS-locked 10 MHz reference signal, and found to be within
7 ppm of the reference. 1-PPS delay measurement accuracy
assessed by measuring the delay between the same signal on
channel 1 (the reference) and channels 2–4 (the measuring
channels) 1800 times. The mean delay was 1.0 ns with a
standard deviation of 1.6 ns. Delays were bounded within –
6 ns to +3.5 ns.
Each failure and recovery test was conducted three times.
The results were compared and found to be consistent between
repetitions. These experiments, and those in [6], found that the
response of the slave clocks to grandmaster corrections was
based on the size of the correction.
B. Network Failure
The response of the BMC algorithm to two common failures
(network outage and GPS failure) was tested using three
grandmasters. The adoption of the active grandmaster role
by another grandmaster when the previously active grand-
master ceases transmitting Announce messages was tested by
removing the network connection from the preferred grand-
master for one minute. The other grandmaster waited for the
portDS.announceReceiptTimeout to elapse, which was set to
3 s, before transmitting Sync and Announce messages. The
1-PPS output of two slave clocks and the 1-PPS output of
the backup grandmaster was monitored relative to the initial
grandmaster. This allowed for synchronizing transients to
be detected, as identified by Kozakai and Kanda [19]. PTP
Ethernet traffic was captured for 30 s prior to the network
disconnection until 60 s after the network was reinstated.
The failure of electronics within the grandmaster, or its
power supply, resulted in a similar failure to network discon-
nection. The recovery from a power outage takes longer due
to the boot time of the microprocessor, and additional time is
required for the time reference to stabilize.
C. GPS Receiver Failure
Previous research in this area identified that grandmaster
clocks can deviate from International Atomic Time (TAI), and
exceed their holdover specification, when the GPS antenna
is poorly positioned [6]. Slave clocks respond differently
when the grandmaster corrects its internal clock, as the servo
loop characteristic is not standardized. This has ramifications
for substation devices that use the 1-PPS output of the
slave clocks. These tests further investigate this effect with
three grandmasters from different manufacturers, each with
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a different class of internal oscillator. The oscillators used
were an uncompensated crystal oscillator (XO), a temperature
compensated crystal oscillator (TCXO) and an oven controlled
crystal oscillator (OCXO).
In each test the antenna was disconnected from the grand-
master under test and the deviation from the other grandmaster
(which remained synchronized to GPS) was monitored. The
drift was allowed to reach 1 µs and 2 µs, and then the antenna
was reconnected.
V. RESULTS
In this section the results of experimental work evaluating
the slave response to grandmaster failure events, with and
without redundancy, are presented. These results assess the
performance of the algorithms that the redundant timing
topologies (cross connected and third grandmaster) rely upon.
A. Slave Response to Grandmaster Network Failure
Three sets of tests evaluating the failure of the network
connection between the grandmaster and the transparent clock
were performed. These were:
• PTPA and PTPC
• PTPA and PTPD
• PTPC and PTPD
PTPD had a fixed 600 ns offset in its internal clock (inherent,
due to the design of the clock) relative to PTPA and PTPC.
While this is not ideal, this did demonstrate that the slave
clocks were resynchronizing to the new grandmaster.
Fig. 5 illustrates this with a network outage of PTPC,
with PTPD acting as the backup. The top panel of Fig. 5
shows the 1-PPS offset of PTPD (backup grandmaster) ,
PTPB (slave clock) and PTPF (slave clock) from PTPC (main
grandmaster). The lower panel shows the source of Sync
messages throughout the test. The PTPA/PTPD results were
very similar to PTPC/PTPD, and are not shown. The following
sequence of events occurred:
1) The network connection to PTPC was broken at
17h59m30s.
2) The announce timeout of 3 s elapses.
3) PTPD starts transmitting at 17h59m34s.
4) The slave clocks synchronize to PTPD at 17h59m42s.
When PTPC is reconnected a similar sequence takes place:
1) The network connection to PTPC was restored at
18h00m30s.
2) Ethernet port negotiation takes 5 s to complete.
3) PTPC starts transmitting at 18h00m35s.
4) PTPD detects the Announce message from PTPC and
ceases operating as the grandmaster at 18h00m36s.
5) PTPB synchronizes to PTPC at 18h00m41s.
6) PTPF synchronizes to PTPC at 18h00m43s.
The maximum error between the two slave clocks was 782 ns
at 18h00m43s, and was due to the different transient response
of the slave clocks. The time offset between PTPD and PTPC
remained constant as both grandmasters were synchronized
to the GPS system. This is an extreme example where there
was an offset between grandmasters, however in the case
Fig. 5. Slave clock 1-PPS transients in response to a network outage of the
PTPC grandmaster, with PTPD acting as the backup grandmaster (GM).
Fig. 6. Slave clock 1-PPS transients in response to a network outage of the
PTPA grandmaster, with PTPC acting as the backup grandmaster (GM).
with PTPA and PTPC there were no discernible transients
during the handovers, as shown in Fig. 6. When there is no
offset between the internal clocks of the two grandmasters the
transient response of the slave clocks is no longer significant.
The synchronizing result with the failure of power to a
grandmaster is very similar to Fig. 6, however the restoration
time is two to three minutes rather than five seconds.
B. Slave Response to Grandmaster Sync Failure
The response of the two slave clocks to grandmaster cor-
rections was recorded under a number of different conditions.
Three grandmasters (PTPA, PTPC and PTPD) were each
allowed to drift from TAI by disconnecting their GPS antenna.
One of the other grandmasters was used as a GPS locked
TAI reference. Once the drift reached approximately 1 µs the
antenna was reconnected and the transient responses observed.
The results confirmed that the transient responses shown in
[6] (Fig. 11 and Fig. 12) occur with different models of
grandmaster. Fig. 14 and Fig. 15 in [21] also show that the
slave response is equal in magnitude and opposite in sign to
the time step experienced by the grandmaster.Fig. 7 shows
the slave and grandmaster 1-PPS performance, as well as the
active source of Sync messages, when a backup grandmaster
is added to the timing system. The test proceeded as follows:
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Fig. 7. Slave clock 1-PPS response to a grandmaster (GM) losing GPS
synchronization, with a backup grandmaster available.
1) The GPS antenna on PTPA was disconnected at
17h49m02s, however Sync and Announce messages con-
tinued to be sent by PTPA.
2) PTPC started transmitting Sync and Announce messages
at 17h49m16s when it determined that it had a higher
quality clock than PTPA.
3) PTPA stopped transmitting PTP messages after three
Announce messages from PTPC were received.
4) The internal clock of PTPA wandered at 4.5 ns/s.
5) The GPS antenna was reconnected to PTPA when the
wander was approximately –1 µs at 17h53m00s.
6) After 3 s elapsed PTPA started transmitting Sync and
Announce messages.
7) PTPC ceased transmission after reception of one An-
nounce message from PTPA and the slave clocks resyn-
chronized to PTPA after 5 s.
Throughout this process the maximum deviation between the
slave clocks is 338 ns at 17h52m20s, half the deviation
observed when a single grandmaster recovered from a 1 µs
deviation from GPS time.
VI. DISCUSSION
A. Reliability Analysis
Fault tree analysis has shown that duplication of the syn-
chronizing component of a sampled value protection system
has significantly reduced unavailability. The inherent unavail-
ability of the GPS antenna, grandmaster and transparent clock
is 2.474×10−4, which results in a significant reduction in un-
availability when two systems are used. If the grandmaster was
less reliable then this improvement would be less significant,
and therefore using reliable components provides a significant
advantage when duplicating systems. The MTBF achieved by
cross-connecting the two grandmasters in a redundant system
increased by 80% to 53 525 years. The proposed topology
with a third shared grandmaster gives greater gains than the
cross-connect topology. The timing system MTBF exceeds
200 000 years, and the MTBF of the X and Y timing systems
in isolation increases from 6.3 years to 22.3 years. PTP
equipment vendors estimate the marginal cost of a second
PTP Ethernet port to be 10% of a single port grandmaster.
The reliability improvements justify the small cost increase of
the hardware.
The cross-connect and triple-grandmaster systems allow
both the X and Y protection systems can be considered “in
service” even when one grandmaster is out for maintenance.
This increases the likelihood that the power system operator
will allow the protected high voltage plant to remain in service
while a grandmaster is maintained. PTP is a new technology
for substation applications, and this additional redundancy will
be an advantage to utilities trialing networked time synchro-
nization for sampled value or synchrophasor applications.
B. Best Master Clock Performance
The two redundant-but-interconnected timing architectures
proposed in this paper reply upon a clean handover from
a failed or degraded grandmaster to a backup grandmaster.
The results presented here show that the BMC algorithm,
as implemented by three grandmasters and two slave clocks,
is able to achieve this. Fig. 5 and Fig. 6 demonstrate that
the failure of a network connection between the primary
grandmaster clock and the transparent clock does not introduce
a significant 1-PPS offset transient in the output of slave
devices when the active grandmaster changes. The accuracy
requirement of 1 µs from the 9-2LE guideline is met, however
greater accuracy is obtained if the internal clocks in the
redundant grandmasters do not have an offset from each other.
This result is contrary to that found by Kozakai and Kanda
[19], and has been repeated with a range of makes and models
of grandmaster.
The time required for the BMC algorithm to elect a new
grandmaster when the previously active grandmaster stops
is three seconds—the product of the Announce rate (1 s)
and AnnounceTimeout (3). A lower priority grandmaster stops
transmitting after one Announce message. This is a significant
performance improvement over PTPv1, and shows the benefit
of using PTPv2 for this test bed. One disadvantage of such
faster recovery is that the BMC algorithm may not operate
correctly for large networks if the RSTP convergence time
exceeds the announce timeout interval [12].
A step change in time by a grandmaster, often following
a loss of synchronization with the GPS system, was found
in [6] to generate grandmaster/slave offset transients in the
output of slave clocks. These transients are equal in magnitude,
but opposite in sign, to the grandmaster’s correction. Further
testing has confirmed that these 1-PPS offset transients are
generated by a variety of makes and models of grandmaster,
and are unlikely to be a device specific issue. A backup
grandmaster, enabled when the failed grandmaster reports poor
time quality, addresses this problem. Fig. 7 shows that the
slave clocks synchronized to the alternative grandmaster rather
than tracking the faulty grandmaster, and resynchronized with
the primary grandmaster when its time quality improved.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
Reliability analysis using FTA has been presented in this
paper, with results showing that a high level of reliability can
be achieved if grandmaster redundancy is used. The topologies
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used require the BMC algorithm to select the active clock, and
experimental results have shown that the BMC algorithm is
effective in responding to outages affecting the active grand-
master clock. The disconnection of a GPS antenna was used as
the test case for degraded performance, and the disconnection
of the grandmaster network connection was also a test case
for a total grandmaster failure. The slave clock response to
BMC mediated handovers meets the 1 µs requirement of the
widely adopted 9-2LE implementation guideline for sampled
value process buses.
The most reliable solution proposed in this paper, the third
shared grandmaster, significantly improves reliability of the
PTP system over that of simple duplicated timing.
Further modeling and analysis is required to fully determine
the reliability of substation applications that are synchronized
by PTP. FTA is straightforward to apply, however one must
use Boolean reduction when MOEs occur across AND gates,
otherwise the outcomes will be overly optimistic.
A reliable and dependable network based time synchroniza-
tion system will enable “whole of station” process bus systems
to be developed. System integrators and utility decision makers
require confidence that PTP timing systems will meet the
required performance standards, yet not be over-engineered.
The quantitative assessment of availability based on FTA
presented in this paper is a tool that can be used to achieve
this, and application of FTA to a range of timing topologies
has demonstrated the use of this technique.
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